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AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER, A CRITIQUE OF UNITED
NATIONS THEORIES OF AGGRESSION. By JuLIUS STONE.
Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958.
Pp. xiv, 226. $5.00.
Covey T. Oliver t
In his preface the distinguished author refers to the "grim repulsions
of the subject of international aggression and its definition." (p. vii). He
goes on to say that behind these lie "a rich vein of problems and ideas of
fundamental juristic and political importance." (p. vii). For this reviewer
the "grim repulsions" are so much more momentous in relation to world
survival than the "rich vein" that this review will concern itself entirely
with the former, except for stating at this point that Professor Stone in
this book, as always, shows himself to be a very thorough scholar-almost
an "un-Commonwealth" one in the extent and detail of his footnoting and
other documentation-and that international law is very fortunate to share
him with jurisprudence.
Frankly, I have avoided as long as I decently could reviewing this
book. I disagree with Professor Stone, wise senior and friend, about Suez.
Suez dominates a good deal of the book. It is undoubtedly true, as Professor Stone says, again in the preface, that his formulation of the theoretical
issues long preceded the Suez crisis, but the very first sub-division of the
introduction is headed, "Middle East Crisis and Aggression." The orientation thus begun is continued throughout. It is possible of course to differ
about the wisdom of this or that national posture in the Middle East crisis
of 1956-1957 without disagreeing with a legal and jurisprudential analysis
which at some points is influenced by a particular point of view as to the
crisis.
Why do I disagree with Professor Stone? Is it because I think,
contrary to his first main thesis, that any useful purpose would be served
by codifying a detailed, technical definition of aggression? Certainly not.
Professor Stone takes ninety-two pages and four chapters to show that it is
probably impossible as a technical matter and certainly unwise from the
standpoint of the interests of good, Western, free, promise-keeping countries
to attempt to write,_a criminal code for international aggression. These
pages are a marvelous compilation of detailed history of drafts and approaches, national positions, ploys and counter-ploys. The lesson is driven
t Professor of Law at the University of Petnsylvania.
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home with great force: Beware of Potential Enemies Bearing Definitional
Gifts. Yet I doubt that the lesson is necessary-or, at least, that it is very
necessary. I had always thought that the exercise of drafting definitions
of aggression was considerably outside the main stream of the interests and
the preoccupations of states when dealing with each other through international organizations. "On the Problems of Defining Aggression" is, I
think, a more usual topic for graduate seminars in international organizations law than for staff conferences in foreign offices. If after the next
Summit or otherwise the topic should again become "hot," which I doubt,
Professor Stone's first series of chapters should be required reading for
decision-makers. For students they should be anyway.
My difference with Professor Stone concerns the application of article
2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations. In his fifth chapter, "Aggression and the Charter," the author examines this Charter provision, which
reads:
"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations."
He reports as an "extreme view" the notion that the Charter forbids
national use of force with only two exceptions: (1) collective or individual
self-defense under article 51, and (2) collective action called for or authorized by competent United Nations organs. He admits that the negotiating
history at San Francisco supports this "extreme view" (p. 99); but, with
an analytical approach reminiscent of Hans Kelsen, he writes of the words
quoted above:
"Article 2(4) does not forbid 'the threat or use of force' simpliciter; it
forbids it only when directed 'against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the purposes of the United Nations.'" (p. 95). (Emphasized in
original.)
In other words, it is arguably consistent with the purposes of the
Charter for a member state to use its national forces to achieve its national
objectives, provided its use of such forces is not directed against the territory or independence of the state against which such forces move! The
implication is unmistakable that Britain (to preserve the "life line" she
apparently did not need so badly after all or which was not as seriously
impaired as she thought) and France (to put an end to subversion of
Algeria from Cairo by radio and otherwise) acted within the Charter in
their landing at Port Said-an operation foolhardy from the military standpoint if from none other.
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With an important subsidiary conclusion of Professor Stone's I have
no quarrel, viz: that the General Assembly acted wisely in failing to condemn Britain and France as aggressors and in taking into account a wide
range of factors in attempting to settle the crisis. What I find worrisome
is Professor Stone's teaching that the Charter is not even on its face a
complete mechanism for dealing with use of national military force. The
worry is not exclusively or even mainly about purely legal issues. Professor Stone, Dean Acheson, and others have posed the question, "Why
did the United States in the Suez crisis turn against its oldest and truest
Allies, put a terrible strain on NATO, and give tactical advantages to the
Soviet bloc?" Was this evidence of that "legalistic-moralistic" outlook
of American foreign policy which Kennan and others had condemned
earlier? Or was it a clever-too clever and too heartless--exploitafion of
the difficult positions of competitors for Middle East oil and what not?
Was the United States looking beyond its alliances for the present bi-polar
power struggle to the day when real power would come into the hands of
Afro-Asian nations? Or was it that the American military experts saw
how dangerously exposed to heavy casualties the landing force at Said was
and wished to head off the stirring of deeper emotions a military disaster
there would bring about in Britain and France?
I do not know what answer history will give about the motivations of
the Canadians, the Indians, and the numerous company of other nonSoviet states which sided against the British and French during the crisis,
but I am reasonably sure that history's answer for the United States will
be quite simple and quite important in the context of this review: the
President was of the opinion that if this crisis was not headed off the
United Nations would go the way the League did after the farce of sanctions against Italy.
Perhaps the United Nations cannot maintain the respect of mankind
with Hungary in memory; perhaps it can in time regain what it lost there.
But if both the Hungarian and the Middle East crises had been resolved in
favor of national use of force for national ends, the Organization would
have died then and there. As Ambassador Bohlen is quoted as having
observed, the Middle East crisis was a political disaster for the anti-Soviet
bloc because it did distract attention from the Hungarian situation. One
remembers, also, the rather strange event of the President of the United
States, no scholar of jurisprudence, discoursing before television on the
fundamental point that two wrongs do not make a right. Finally, to be
dreadfully cold-blooded about the Hungarian situation, it differed from the
Port Said crisis in that the issues in dispute in Hungary were issues of fact.
So were they, perhaps, regarding Israel in the Sinai campaign. In truth,
the disputed issues of fact in the Hungarian situation (stipulating the far
greater moral depravity of the Soviets there) were not unlike the disputed
issues of fact in the invasion of Guatemala from Honduras a few years
earlier. Both Hungary and Guatemala involved the grim gambit of the
plaintiff disappearing before the issues of fact were settled.
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It is disheartening enough to admit that international organization does
not yet cope adequately with making crucial decisions of fact. Undoubtedly
one of the things wrong with efforts to define aggression in an international
code of crimes is that in this field the real issues will usually be issues of
fact, and of subjective fact, like intent and motive, at that. But, to understate, it would probably be fatally traumatic to the United Nationg to
establish that the Charter does not control the use of national military
force as a matter of law either. The incident at Said involved no issues
of fact such as: "Did the Hungarian Government ask the Soviets in?"
"Were the invaders of Guatemala from Honduras all exiled Guatemalans
and, if so, where did they get their airplanes from ?" Professor Stone has
done well to put the case for the defense on law, not fact. I think his
law is bad law, not mainly or necessarily as a matter of legislative history,
plain meaning, or logic, but from the standpoint of the national interest
of such a country as the United States in the United Nations Organization.
In the hydrogen bomb age use of force to attain national objectives not
otherwise obtainable is simply too dangerous to be considered as an alternative in national policy making. Mankind may destroy the earth even if
the Charter continues to be regarded as imposing legal controls on the
unilateral use of national force. Such destruction seems to me rather more
certain if we reinterpret the Charter to reestablish, albeit in restricted form,
the dictum of realpolitik that use of force is simply the pursuit of national
policy by other means.
But Professor Stone points a way out, I believe, and this is the greatest
of his contributions in this work. He suggests, quite rightly, that the bar
on use of force tends to create pathological situations when states cannot
establish their just claims and protect their vital interests, because they
cannot get the United Nations to agree with their assessments of situations.
Suppose such states do use force, what then? Professor Stone suggests
that the competent organs of the United Nations should avoid wherever
possible approaching the resulting crisis in terms of collective action against
an aggressor, that the whole situation be regarded as a threat to peace and be
dealt with in the broad, taking into account the whole range of issues and
problems out of which the use of force resulted. This approach treats
unauthorized use of force almost as a psychotic response to frustration and
injustice. In princple this is sound, but I hope states tempted to use force
in such situations will have care, for as any person who followed the whole
Middle East crisis on television might reasonably predict, the emotions and
national reactions stirred by new military adventurism might be such as to
make it exceedingly difficult to count on an international frame of mind
friendlier to treatment than to punishment. Perhaps it will be wiser to take
article 2(4) as still meaning what it meant at San Francisco even if to do so
means that states may (1) have to put up with some injustice to avoid
involving the world in atomic war, or (2) put themselves to work to devise
more effective means short of national use of force for the attainment of
justice.
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THE REGULATION OF RAIL-MOTOR RATE COMPETITION.
By ERNEST W. WILLIAMS, JR. New York: Harper & Brothers,
1958. Pp. ix, 247. $4.50.
William E. Rance t
With the enactment of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 (now part II of
the Interstate Commerce Act) 1 the Interstate Commerce Commission acquired control over both sides of the competitive struggle between the railroads and the interstate commercial motor carriers. As might be expected,
this struggle, both before and after 1935, has centered largely around the
system of pricing utilized by these two modes of transportation in competing
for that not inconsiderable portion of the nation's traffic which by virtue of
its particular characteristics is susceptible of movement by either mode. It
is with this aspect of the struggle and its regulation by the Commission since
1935 that Professor Williams has concerned himself.
The basis for the author's analysis of the subject matter consists
primarily of those reported decisions of the Commission which in one way
or another touch upon rate competition between the rail and motor carriers.
This analysis has been undertaken not merely with the object of attempting
to extract those principles which the Commission itself has developed for
application within this area of its jurisdiction, but with the even more elusive
objective of making a qualitative judgment of the performance to date by
both the Commission and the affected carriers. In the author's words, his
intent "is primarily to ascertain how the Commission has been exercising
its expanded authority, not from the point of view of procedure, but from
the point of view of the substance of its findings and orders. Such a quest
necessarily poses questions concerning the adequacy of the Commission's
performance and some suggestions for its improvement. It also brings into
view the attitude and behavior of the carriers of both types and may raise
questions whether their policies were well adapted to assisting the Commission in its work and to aiding the implementation of the declared national
transportation policy." (p. ix). In consideration of the nature of such an
undertaking and presumably in deference to the Commission and to the
carriers, recognition is given to the fact that the period involved "has never
been blessed with 'normal' conditions." (p. vii).
Following an introductory chapter in which the relative roles of the
railroads and the motor carriers, the characteristics of the competition between them, and the applicable provisions of law are briefly discussed, the
great bulk of Professor Williams' efforts are given over to a rather painstaking analysis of the rail-motor rate competition cases themselves. This
has been performed by segregating the cases into chapters which deal respectively with rail investigation and suspension proceedings, rail fourth section
t Member of the Ohio Bar.
149 Stat. 543 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-27 (1952), as amended, 49
U.S.C. §§ 313(a) (11)-(22) (Supp. V, 1958).
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proceedings, 2 motor carrier investigation and suspension proceedings, and
cases in which the Commission has issued minimum rate orders within the
several motor carrier rate territories. Treatment of the rail-motor rate
competition cases in this fashion has enabled the author to extract the
controlling considerations which have evolved from the Commission's
decisional process as well as to lay the foundation for his subsequent qualitative judgment of the Commission's performance. So far as the decisional
principles themselves are concerned, they are easily recognized as the classic
considerations which are now all too familiar to the initiated. Not surprising is the fact that the author often appears to be perplexed by his inability
to reconcile apparently conflicting decisions by the Commission. This problem, inherent in the administrative process by reason of the quasi-legislative
nature of the Commission's functions, the broad discretion conferred on the
Commission by the pertinent statutes, the assignment of the case load to
separate divisions of the Commission, the inapplicability of the doctrine of
stare decisis to proceedings before administrative agencies, and the very
limited scope of judicial review of Commission decisions, appears to have
plagued Professor Williams as it has troubled almost every writer who has
undertaken a critical analysis of the Commission's decisional pattern in a
given area of its jurisdiction.
The really significant contribution of the author is contained in the last
two chapters of the book. It is there that he undertakes both to discuss
the relation of rail and truck rates and to appraise the Commission's performance to date. The former undertaking is conducted primarily in terms
of a pervasive review of the history of the several adjustments by both rail
and motor carriers of their rates on the intensely competitive petroleum,
textile, tobacco and alcoholic liquors traffic. To this have been added certain
allusions to the observations of other students of the problem of intercarrier
competition. Most interesting, of course, is the author's effort to appraise
the Commission's performance since acquiring its authority over the rates of
both types of carriers. That appraisal, obviously constructed from the
standpoint of the economist, is highly critical of the Commission's treatment
of the problem. Charging it with having "taken a negative rather than an
affirmative view of its responsibilities under the Act," Professor Williams
concludes that "a study of some 900 cases is more revealing of what the
Commission has not done than of what it has done by way of establishing
any definite economic principles of broad scope that fit into the several
theories offered by students of the problem of intercarrier competition." (p.
201). The essence of this criticism is the charge that the Commission's
action in this area has been altogether too passive in that it has tended to take
only those actions which are most pressing, and that in those cases in which
it has acted it appears to have been motivated by a desire to preserve both
the rail and motor carriers in the entire range of service in which it found
249 Stat. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 4 (1952), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§4(1) (Supp. V, 1958).
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them at the time at which they both became subject to its jurisdiction. This
desire is said to have resulted in a preoccupation with the "preservation of
the opportunity to compete and to secure a 'fair' share of the traffic."
(p. 210). The author, on the other hand, would have the Commission
aggressively define the points in this area in which regulatory action as
opposed to the free play of competition is justified, clearly interpret the
mandates of the national transportation policy, and more fully explore the
respective areas of economic superiority of both rail and motor carriers
with the object of promoting a division of the available traffic along the lines
of such superiority. This, of course, is not the first time that criticism of
this nature has been leveled at the Commission. The extent to which such
criticism is justified-a criticism which affects the adequacy of the administrative process as well as the economic interests of the respective carriers
and the users of their services-is admittedly a thorny and most controversial issue. Its resolution is not likely to be an easy matter.
A striking incident to the appearance of Professor Williams' book is
the fact that present conditions regarding rail-motor rate competition point
to the necessity for its early revision. The Transportation Act of 1958 added
section 15a(3) 3 to the so-called rule of rate making. The most significant
feature of that section is the provision that, "Rates of a carrier shall not be
held up to a particular level to protect the traffic of any other mode of
transportation, giving due consideration to the objectives of the national
transportation policy declared in this Act." The inclusion of this language
in section 15a(3) has been popularly referred to as "the closing of the
umbrella." 4 Opinions as to its effect on intercarrier competitive rate cases
range all the way from the railroad point of view that the Commission is
now foreclosed from giving any consideration to the effect on the motor
carriers of proposed rail rate reductions to the view of the motor carrier
industry generally that this language effects no substantive change in the
law and that it simply represents a codification in statutory form of the
Commission's prior policy.
The question of its precise meaning has already been at issue in at
least two important intercarrier competitive rate cases decided by the
Commission. 5 However, a definitive interpretation of the language unfortunately failed to materialize from either of the two proceedings. In the
first, a number of railroads published reduced rates in an effort to recapture
certain sugar traffic from their water carrier competitors. The Commission
found the proposed railroad reductions to be just and reasonable and at the
same time issued a plain invitation to the protestant barge lines to reduce
their rates so as to reestablish a water route differential below the reduced
3

4

72 Stat. 572 (1958), 49 U.S.C.A. § 15a(3) (Supp. 1958).
Panel Discussion, Revised Ride of Rate Making, 26 I.C.C. PRAc. J. 1146, 1161

(1959) ; cf. New Automobiles in Interstate Commerce, 259 I.C.C. 475 (1945).
5
Paint & Related Articles-Official Territory, No. I & S 7027, ICC, Aug. 27,
1959; Sugar-Gulf & South Atlantic Ports to Ohio River Crossings, No. I & S
6914, ICC, July 24, 1959.
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railroad rates. 6 Shortly thereafter, the Commission decided the second case
which was universally regarded by the transportation world as bringing
squarely into issue the legislative purpose and the effect of section 15a(3).
At issue were certain rail rate reductions on paint and related articles
designed to recapture this traffic from both private and for-hire motor
carriers. While finding the proposed railroad reductions to be lawful,
the Commission failed to come to grips with the paramount question of the
meaning of the newly enacted statutory language.7 For this it was severely
reprimanded by Commissioner Webb in a concurring opinion. Thus, the
question of the legislative purpose and the effect of section 15a(3) awaits
an answer in future litigation.
Interestingly enough, at least one segment of the motor carrier industry
has not been adverse to the use of section 15a(3) in the interest of its
members. Certain motor carriers of iron and steel articles are presently
engaged in an attempt to have enjoined and set aside a recent order of the
Commission prescribing a scale of motor carrier rates on these articles
based on rail distances which in some instances appear to be longer than
the highway distances actually traversed.8 The issue, as might be expected,
is whether that section now forecloses the Commission from establishing
rates for one mode of transportation according to conditions prevailing for
another mode.
6 Sugar-Gulf & South Atlantic Ports to Ohio River Crossings, .upra note 5.
7
Paint & Related Articles-Official Territory, No. I & S 7027, ICC, Aug. 27,
1959.
S Iron & Steel Articles-Eastern Common Carriers, 305 I.C.C. 369 (1959).
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